Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand
8 February 2005

MEDIA RELEASE

For further information contact:
Bill Sommer
Tel: 0-4-560 9411 or 0-27-546 8216

The accident report can be viewed on the CAA web site, www.caa.govt.nz, under Accidents & incidents - Fatal accident reports, or use this link:
http://www.caa.govt.nz/Accident_Reports/ZK-IUE_Fatal_03Jan2003.pdf

Begins

Aircraft Accident Report

ZK-IUE, Paparangi Station (37 km southeast of Opotiki), 3 January 2003

A Civil Aviation Authority safety investigation has concluded that the pilot of a Bell204 (UH-1E) died when his helicopter crashed while on logging operations. Damage to the main and tail rotors of the helicopter, caused when the lifting longline separated from the grapnel assembly and recoiled up into the main rotor, deprived the pilot of control of the helicopter, and resulted in an uncontrolled impact with the ground.

On the afternoon of Friday 3 January 2003, the helicopter was on a logging operation, extracting fallen or standing dead timber from a block of native forest. On the fourteenth lift of the day, the pilot landed the log, and the grapnel appeared to release normally. As the pilot applied power to climb away, the automatic grapnel re-engaged on the log when the lifting longline tautened. The resulting jerk caused the line to pull free at the lower end and recoil up into the path of the main rotor. The tail rotor separated when struck by the flailing line, and control of the helicopter was lost. It struck the ground a short distance from the landing site and was destroyed by impact and fire. The pilot died instantly in the high-energy impact.

The pilot, regarded as one of New Zealand's most experienced pilots in the heli-logging role, was appropriately licensed, rated and fit to undertake the task being performed. The helicopter was airworthy and operating normally up to the time of the accident.

The safety investigation established conclusively that the accident was not due to any defect or problem with the helicopter, but to an unexpected parting of the lifting longline and its recoil up into the main rotor.

Rather than the previously-used wire lifting longline, the pilot had chosen to use a new Vectran® line that, he had told the sawmilling crew, gave an extra 60kilogram useful load, and was some 30 feet longer. This type of synthetic rope did not comply with Civil Aviation Rule 133.255 (External Load Equipment), because while the inner core of the rope had a very high strength to weight ratio and low stretch, the outer braided polyester protective sheath was far more elastic, allowing recoil if any breakage occurred. The supplier of the rope had told the pilot that it was used principally in yacht rigging, and that it was not intended for use as a lifting longline.

The circumstances of the accident and the part played by the rope longline were relayed with a suitable caution to the aviation industry within days of the accident. Other than this prompt advice, no new safety actions or recommendations were developed as a result of the CAA investigation.